This essay in celebration of Grossman and Hart (1986) (GH) discusses how the introduction of incomplete contracts has fundamentally changed economists'perspec-
has allowed us to address issues of (contingent) control allocation and renegotiation which had been absent from previous discussions of corporate …nance and …nancial contracting.
My other work with David Scharfstein turns out to have contained both elements of the incomplete contracts approach and elements of the dynamic programming approach (for lack of a better term), as subsequent work by DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) and DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) has highlighted.
Before discussing the incomplete contracts literature in corporate …nance I will begin with a brief summary of the state of corporate …nance theory pre GH-1986 . I will then turn to a discussion of some of the main themes of the corporate …nance theory literature post GH-1986 and evaluate the relative merits of the incomplete contracts and dynamic programming approaches. I shall argue that while both approaches have considerably improved our understanding of the dynamics of corporate …nance they both still lack operational and practical relevance. Unlike the tradeo¤ theory inherited from Modigliani and Miller, which has huge practical relevance, the more modern incentive and incomplete contracting approaches have so far had a limited practical impact. I will conclude in suggesting a way forward in closing this important gap, based on recent work of mine with Hui Chen and Neng Wang.
Modigliani and Miller and the Foundations of Corporate Finance
Modern Corporate Finance practice is founded on Modigliani and Miller's classic (1958) article on the cost of capital. In this article they lay out a methodology for valuing investments and argue that the value of a …rm is independent of how the …rm is …nanced. Economists have mostly focused on the famous Modigliani and Miller (MM) irrelevance theorem, stating that when capital markets are competitive and e¢ cient, and when there are no taxes and bankruptcy costs, then the way a …rm is …nanced is irrelevant. That is to say, under these conditions the value of a …rm is independent of its liability structure, and only depends on the value of its assets. The MM irrelevance theorem, already implicit in Arrow and Debreu's (1954) proof of existence of a general competitive equilibrium, is a central proposition in general equilibrium theory, which pins down the objective function of a …rm (and ensures 'shareholder unanimity').
In the real world, of course, some key conditions of the theorem are not met, in particular the presence of taxes and bankruptcy costs. Therefore, the way …rms are …nanced in practice is not irrelevant to their value. Nevertheless, the Modigliani and Miller logic and their approach to determining a …rm's cost of capital has still proved to be of enormous practical value. I am referring here to their famous weighted average cost of capital (WACC ), and their approach to valuation based on discounting a …rm's free cash ‡ow using WACC. Combined with a suitable asset pricing model (most often in practice the Capital Asset Pricing Model, CAPM ), and correcting for taxes, the discounted cash ‡ow approach using WACC is today the most widely used approach to valuation and corporate investments (see Graham and Harvey, 2001 ).
This approach to valuation is closely linked with a simple theory of the optimal capital structure of the …rm: the tradeo¤ theory (see Miller 1977 , Brennan and Schwartz, 1978 , DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980 , and Leland, 1994 , which is still widely accepted. According to this theory, debt is a cheaper source of capital for the …rm after tax if one ignores bankruptcy costs. If it were not for deadweight bankruptcy costs it would be e¢ cient for the …rm to …nance itself only with debt. In the presence of bankruptcy costs, the optimum debt-equity ratio is determined by equating the marginal tax shield bene…t of debt with the expected marginal bankruptcy cost.
The tradeo¤ theory assumes that the …rm's cash ‡ow is observable and veri…able, and that any promised debt repayment satisfying the …rm's limited liability constraint is enforceable.
Models of the tradeo¤ theory typically assume that Debt is a …xed claim ( …xed coupon payments plus principal) which is independent of the …rm's realized earnings and equity is a claim entitling the owners to the …rm's free cash ‡ow net of debt obligations. These models also typically assume that the …rm's cash ‡ow is …xed and reduce the …rm's …nancing problem to an optimal allocation problem of the …rm's cash ‡ow to the holders of debt and equity, the tax authorities and nature (in the form of deadweight costs of bankruptcy). This is a highly reductive theory of corporate …nance, which misses many key aspects of corporate …nancial management. And, just as the CAPM, the tradeo¤ theory has found little empirical support (see e.g. MacKie- Mason, 1990 , and Rajan and Zingales, 1995) . Still, the tradeo¤ theory, especially in its 'dynamic' version following Leland (1994) , retains a central place in corporate …nance, mainly because it o¤ers the most operational approach to the determination of the …rm's optimal capital structure and to the valuation of risky debt. True, the Leland (1994) model 'predicts' excessively high leverage ratios, but the more dynamic formulation in Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) is able to predict reasonably accurate debt levels and credit spreads.
Grossman and Hart: Incomplete Contracts and Corporate Control
How is the corporate …nance theory landscape changed post Grossman and Hart (1986) ?
One central dimension missing from the MM approach to corporate …nance discussed above is ownership and control. The MM approach remains silent on how a …rm's cash ‡ow is determined. It takes the cash ‡ow as given and only asks how it should be allocated among di¤erent claimants and how it should be valued. In contrast, the incomplete contracts approach to corporate …nance seeks to understand corporate control and how the exercise of control is a¤ected by the …rm's choice of …nancing. This is a richer and signi…cantly more complex theory than the tradeo¤ theory. I will argue that it has yielded important new conceptual insights, but that it has so far only had a marginal operational impact. As much as chief …nancial o¢ cers (CFOs) feel that they need to understand the MM approach to corporate …nance, they have so far not shown much interest in the more modern theories of corporate …nance that emphasize, adverse selection, moral hazard, incomplete contracts and control. It is not that they are unaware of the importance of these issues, but that the theory so far has o¤ered little operational guidance.
Before dealing with corporate …nance post Grossman and Hart (1986) I must brie ‡y discuss the 'agency theories'of corporate …nance, which provide a …rst analysis of the endogenous determination of a …rm's cash ‡ow.
Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
Jensen and Meckling (1976) provide the …rst formal analysis of the incentive implications of a …rm's choice of capital structure. They start from Berle and Means'(1932) observation that if the managers in control of a …rm's operations only own a small fraction of the company's stock, they are likely to run the …rm ine¢ ciently, or at least not in shareholders'best interests.
They then suggest an argument in favor of debt …nancing, which has later become the main justi…cation for leveraged buyouts (LBOs): by …nancing a …rm with debt, managers are able to retain concentrated equity ownership in the …rm, and thus are incentivized to invest in future cash ‡ows that enhance shareholder value. However-they continue-too much debt …nancing creates its own incentive problems, excess risk-taking, so that the optimal leverage ratio for the …rm trades o¤ the moral hazard bene…ts in terms of better investment incentives for managers against the excess risk-taking incentives for shareholders of highly levered …rms.
Excess risk-taking by highly levered …rms, has, alas, become an all too familiar notion after the …nancial crisis of 2008.
Another familiar cost faced by highly indebted borrowers is debt overhang, a concept …rst formally analyzed by Myers (1977) . Highly indebted borrowers facing the risk of …nancial distress will pass up valuable investment opportunities or even sell assets at …re sale prices.
To reduce the risk of debt overhang it may thus be desirable for …rms not to borrow too much. Also, should a …rm end up with too much debt on its books it may be desirable for borrower and lender to renegotiate or 'restructure'some of this debt. This latter observation provides the main economic justi…cation for the existence of bankruptcy reorganization and debt resolution procedures.
Next to these theories of capital structure based on moral hazard problems, Myers and Majluf (1984) have proposed a powerful theory based on asymmetric information or adverse selection. They argue that the …rm as an issuer of claims on the …rm's cash ‡ow has to overcome investors' suspicion that the …rm may be trying to sell overpriced claims. This is easiest to do if the …rm is able to issue safe debt (say, senior, short-term, collateralized, debt like repos), for issuer and investors alike ought to be able to easily value such a safe …xed-income instrument. If safe debt is unavailable the next easiest claim to value is risky debt, or possibly convertible debt, and the hardest claim to value may be equity. That is, equity may be the hardest claim to value as it may be the most information sensitive claim.
Which is why, Myers and Majuf-under their pecking order theory-propose that equity claims should only be issued as a last resort and that …rms should …rst use internally generated funds, then safe debt and then if needed risky debt.
These theories are an important advance over the simple tradeo¤ theory and considerably improve our understanding of corporate …nance. However, it should come as no surprise that the pure agency theories of corporate …nance encounter similar conceptual di¢ culties as the Principal-Agent theory a la Grossman-Hart (1983) . Indeed, a central problem with agency theories of corporate …nance, as Dybvig and Zender (1991) have emphasized, is that it is perfectly possible to separate the choice of capital structure of the …rm from the problem of optimally incentivizing a …rm's manager by directly designing an optimal compensation contract for the CEO. Under an optimal incentive contract, which admittedly may be very complex and sensitive to the special circumstances a …rm …nds itself in, it is possible to address directly all relevant moral hazard and adverse selection issues, so that capital structure choice again becomes irrelevant or is determined by the tradeo¤ theory.
In sum, the …rm's capital structure is relevant for managerial incentives, and therefore also for corporate control, only if incentive and …nancial contracting is limited by enforcement constraints; that is, only if contracts are incomplete.
Incomplete Contracts and Corporate Control Contingent Control Allocation
This last observation was the starting point of our analysis with Philippe in Aghion and Bolton (1992) . Having learnt from Oliver and Sandy the relevance of incomplete contracts for the theory of the …rm's boundaries, we simply adopted their pragmatic approach to modeling incomplete …nancial contracts, and proceeded to develop a theory of capital structure choice which included the dimension of corporate control. The general idea sounds simple enough, but as we painfully learned, its execution was far from obvious.
We started by assuming that not all actions available to a manager and not all states of the world were describable ex ante in a contract or veri…able. Our thinking was that if some future action choices could not be speci…ed in a contract, this would give rise to a problem of control, as some actions (and states of the world) left out of the initial contract would have to be determined ex-post. This would then raise the question: who is charged with taking these actions? In other words, who is in control? But, this was only the starting point, as the next question was why it was relevant at all who is in control? In our bilateral contracting problem with an entrepreneur and a …nancier allocations of control to one or the other party would have to lead to di¤erent outcomes for control to matter at all. Di¤erent outcomes presupposed di¤erent objectives, which could neither be fully aligned through ex ante contracting nor through ex post renegotiation.
Our …rst approach to this second question was to assume that the entrepreneur and …nancier had di¤erent beliefs about which investments were preferable. Based on casual observation, we assumed that the entrepreneur was generally more optimistic about the success of risky investments than the …nancier. This di¤erence of opinions combined with the assumption of limited liability (and limited wealth of the entrepreneur) naturally gives rise to con ‡icting objectives, which cannot be fully aligned through contracting. It also gives rise to a plausible contingent control allocation.
The entrepreneur seeks to keep control in the states of the world where the di¤erence of opinions is largest; that is, where she is likely to be much more optimistic about success than the …nancier. And, she is willing to give up control in states of the world where di¤erences of opinion are smaller. To the extent that di¤erences of beliefs are likely to increase as the venture's prospects improve, this contingent control allocation could be implemented through debt …nancing, whereby the …nancier gains control in the event of default and otherwise the entrepreneur retains control. It could also be implemented through staged transfers of control under a Venture Capital (VC) contract.
As simple and plausible as this solution seemed to us, the contract theory community at the time was not ready to accept two departures from orthodoxy in the same paper:
incomplete contracts and di¤erences of opinion. We received almost unanimous advice to change the model and do away with di¤erences of opinion. So, instead of modeling di¤erences in objectives arising from di¤erent beliefs, we modeled them as arising from the presence of private bene…ts: we assumed that the entrepreneur derives both …nancial returns and private bene…ts from the venture, while the investor derives only …nancial returns. In a way, this new model is more general,as di¤erences of opinion can be mapped into …nancial returns and a particular form of 'private bene…ts', but vice-versa, it is not always possible to transform an objective function combining …nancial rewards plus private bene…ts into an objective function with no private bene…ts but di¤erences of beliefs.
Our model delivers predictions on the separation of cash- ‡ow and control rights that are consistent with common contractual clauses in VC contracts, as Kaplan and Stromberg's (2003) study of Venture Capital contracts revealed. It also delivers predictions on cash inventory management under investor control, showing that it may be optimal for the entrepreneur to accumulate cash reserves that may be used to induce the investor to choose an investment with high private bene…ts for the entrepreneur. While these are valuable qualitative insights, the model remains in many ways too abstract and general to be an op-erationally useful analytical tool. Part of the di¢ culty lies in the somewhat vague notion of private bene…ts. The other di¢ culty is that the enforcement limits on …nancial contracts are exogenously imposed in a somewhat arbitrary fashion. There is also the conceptual di¢ culty revealed by Maskin and Tirole (1999) that when an action or state of the world is observable to the contracting parties but not to a court (or judge) it can still be made veri…able through a suitable revelation mechanism.
Limited Commitment
For all these reasons it is not completely surprising that most of the subsequent literature on incomplete contracts in corporate …nance has focused on narrower models in which private bene…ts are associated with some form of 'stealing' or cash- ‡ow diversion. The pertinent image here is that of the cashier who is able to discreetly lift a few bills from the cash till.
This literature also downplays the 'observable but not veri…able'distinction, and focuses on what is now generally referred to as a 'limited commitment'problem that the borrower faces due to her limited ability to commit to repay a loan. Perhaps the main conceptual innovation of limited commitment models is a better understanding of the mechanics of debt default. Under the MM approach, default is assumed to occur when the …rm is insolvent; that is, when debt liabilities exceed the value of the …rm's assets (see e.g. Merton, 1974) . This is a natural assumption if …nancial contracts are perfectly enforceable, for if the …rm were to default when it is still solvent then debtholders could simply enforce payment by seizing the …rm's assets. In contrast, under limited commitment it is possible to separate default from insolvency and to distinguish between liquidity and strategic defaults.
The former is a situation where the …rm is forced to default due to a cash shortage and the latter one where the …rm chooses to default and force a debt restructuring because it is in its interest even though it is able to service the existing debt. Allowing for strategic default is a major conceptual breakthrough because it draws attention to an important practical aspect of debt design that is completely absent from the MM approach, namely the protections that creditors require in the form of seniority, collateral, security interests, and covenants. These are all protections that increase the likelihood that creditors will be repaid by reducing the probability of a strategic default and by increasing the creditors' bargaining position in a future debt renegotiation. Under the MM approach and the tradeo¤ theory, all the …rm's debts should be junior unsecured debt. Indeed, these debts would give the …rm all the tax shields it wants and would minimize bankruptcy costs, as these debts are relatively easy to restructure or dilute with new debt issues.
Debt Structure
In Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) we show how the threat of strategic default can be mitigated by having a well-protected, dispersed debt structure, which is di¢ cult to renegotiate simply because it is more di¢ cult to bring many people around a bargaining table. We also show that depending on the risk of a liquidity default, the …rm may or may not want to structure its debt to make it di¢ cult to restructure. If the risk of a liquidity default is high the …rm may be better o¤ with a debt structure that is easy to restructure, while if the risk of a liquidity default is low the …rm may prefer to have debt that is hard to renegotiate.
In Freixas (2000, 2006) we apply these ideas further and distinguish between expensive (due to intermediation costs) bank relationship-lending, which is ‡exible and easy to restructure, and cheaper bond issues, which are, however, more di¢ cult to restructure, and derive a partial equilibrium of the …nancial system with co-existence of a banking sector and securities markets. In this equilibrium riskier …rms rely on bank lending as an important source of funding, because they value the ‡exibility it o¤ers, while safer …rms rely more on bond …nancing. This model lends itself, in particular, to an analysis of monetary policy through the 'lending channel'. Their model, in particular, provides more accurate estimates of credit spreads than other structural models without strategic default.
Non-Exclusivity
This …rst generation of debt structure models takes a comprehensive contracting approach to the design of debt structure: the number of creditors, and the seniority structure are optimally determined ex-ante in a multilateral (incomplete) contract with the borrower.
The implicit premise in this literature is that the debt structures we observe are e¢ cient from an ex-ante perspective. A more recent, second generation of debt structure models, relaxes the assumption of ex-ante comprehensive contracting and adds another dimension of contractual incompleteness, namely that debt structure is the equilibrium outcome of a debt contracting game with non-exclusivity.
The notion of non-exclusivity refers to the fact that a borrower may be able to borrow from a second set of creditors without the agreement from the …rst set of lenders. The analysis of equilibrium debt structures under non-exclusivity can be formulated as a common agency game with externalities (see Bernheim and Whinston, 1985 , 1986a , 1986b and Segal, 1999 . Not surprisingly, in the presence of externalities the equilibrium outcome of the contracting game will generally be ine¢ cient. In the context of a corporate debt structure problem, when new debts are piled onto old debts, the expected payo¤ of old creditors is a¤ected, as the new debts may increase the probability of default and reduce the recovery value of old debts in default. Since new creditors do not take account of this externality on old creditors, there tends to be too much debt in an equilibrium with non-exclusivity (see e.g. Bizer and DeMarzo, 1992 , for an early analysis of borrowing with non-exclusivity from multiple lenders). This is why non-exclusivity is a major concern for creditors, and to the extent possible creditors will attempt to protect themselves against future lending by the …rm through various forms of debt covenants in the debt contract.
The e¢ ciency of corporate debt structures and corporate borrowing thus depends to a large extent on the protection o¤ered by debt covenants. The e¤ectiveness of debt covenants, in turn, depends on how easy they are to enforce and how comprehensive an exclusion they provide. In short, the area where the issue of (endogenous) contractual incompleteness perhaps matters most, when it comes to debt contracts, is the design and enforcement of debt covenants.
As we argue in Ayotte and Bolton (2011), a critical distinction between property rights and contractual rights lies at the heart of the non-exclusivity problem. Following legal scholarship we de…ne a property right as a right that is enforceable both against the parties to a contract and third parties (future potential lenders), while a contractual right is only enforceable against the parties to the contract. Property law limits which rights can be enforced against third parties. The property rights of creditors come mainly in the form of security rights on collateral that has been perfected (i.e. liens on assets that have been registered, and for which, therefore, third parties have been noti…ed). All other debt covenants, whether they are negative pledge clauses, limitations on new investments, or acceleration clauses are only contractual rights against the borrower. In other words, they can only be enforced through legal actions against the borrower (e.g. through injunctions) and they have no force in bankruptcy against new lenders.
The implication is that debt covenants are costly to enforce because they require continuous monitoring of the borrower by the lender. As we argue, the reason why property rights law is structured in this way is to provide basic protections to new lenders against expropriation by old lenders. Indeed, debt covenants can be hard to …nd in a lengthy debt contract, and if all covenants were enforceable against new lenders, these lenders would face potentially huge expropriation risk, which could lead to severe credit rationing in equilibrium.
Given that most covenants are costly to enforce, lenders concerned about non-exclusivity prefer to rely on the property rights o¤ered by collateral and security interests. For many borrowers, however, such as …nancial …rms, there are too few tangible assets that can be used as collateral. For these borrowers, covenants may also be too costly to enforce. As a result, these borrowers may be constrained in maintaining highly ine¢ cient debt structures. These could take the form of excessively short-term debt, as Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2010) have argued in the context of corporate borrowing (and Bolton and Jeanne, 2009 , in the context of sovereign borrowing). Note that according to this theory of debt structure, bank fragility arising from short-term liabilities may be an ine¢ cient equilibrium outcome caused by non-exclusivity and not necessarily an optimal outcome to discipline bank lending, as in Diamond and Rajan (2000) .
Equity Structure
Just as they open the way to a theory of debt structure, incomplete contracting and limited commitment models of corporate …nance also provide a foundation for a theory of equity ownership structure. Thus, Fluck (1998) shows how equity can emerge as an openended claim receiving a regular dividend payment in a self-enforcing equilibrium in a limited commitment environment in which …rm managers can divert cash. Similarly, Myers (2000) , and more recently Lambrecht and Myers (2010) , develop a theory of dividend payments as a way of pre-empting a hostile takeover. Incomplete contracting theories of equity structure can also be divided into e¢ cient equity structure design theories and ine¢ cient equilibrium equity structure theories.
Among the former theories, Admati, P ‡eiderer and Zechner (1994) and Bolton and Von Thadden (1998) argue that concentrated ownership in the hands of a large block-holder may be an optimal ownership structure when monitoring of management is important. An alternative theory of limited controlling block size and optimal managerial entrenchment (implemented e.g. through poison-pills) by Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) and Pagano and Roell (1998) is that managers'discretion needs to be protected to some extent to give them optimal incentives to originate new investment opportunities.
Among the latter theories, Bebchuk (1999) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) argue that ownership concentration arises as an ine¢ cient equilibrium outcome driven by the blockholder's inability to commit not to divert cash from the …rm and desire to protect valuable private bene…ts of control.
An Assessment
As the above brief discussion of the corporate …nance theory literature post Grossman and Hart (1986) suggests, the introduction of limited commitment into the MM framework has substantially enriched our understanding of corporate control, corporate debt structure, leverage, and equity structure. As a positive theory of corporate …nance, the limited commitment theory o¤ers many new predictions, some of which have been borne out in empirical studies.
As a normative theory, the limited commitment approach also o¤ers a useful framework to assess legal interventions shaping equity and debt structures. However, normative analyses based on limited commitment models are often constrained by the lack of realism of these models with respect to the core assumption of non-veri…ability of cash ‡ows, investments, and states of nature. In reality, both investments and earnings are partially veri…able.
Moreover, the contracting parties can spend resources to make them more veri…able. Also, the contractual incompleteness of debt contracts in practice is endogenous and is not simply the outcome of a technological or institutional constraint.
As a result, the contracts, …nancial structures, and legal rules observed in reality sometimes bear only a distant resemblance with the contracts derived in the theory. While a good theory inevitably leads to such simpli…cations and abstractions, these, of course, also make a normative analysis more di¢ cult. Still, relative to the MM framework of complete markets (with or without asymmetric information), the introduction of incomplete contracts and limited commitment has considerably enriched our understanding of corporate …nance practice and corporate law.
The one major weakness of limited commitment and agency theories of corporate …nance, however, is that they are not operational. Unlike the MM approach (and the tradeo¤ theory), agency and limited commitment models do not o¤er a methodology that practitioners can use. This is why thirty …ve years after the publication of Jensen and Meckling (1976) , agency, information, and control issues still remain marginal and esoteric topics con…ned to advanced corporate …nance classes. These issues are often treated more like an afterthought, something that is mentioned as a caveat following a systematic and thorough valuation exercise based on the MM approach.
As a result, agency issues are often ignored in practice simply because there is no simple quantitative methodology available to handle them. My view, therefore, is that before we pursue further re…nements of the theory to put it on stronger foundations we need to make more progress on making the theory more operational, even if this means taking shortcuts.
The structural models following Leland (1994) o¤er one direction, but they need to be augmented to introduce agency costs and limited commitment.
I have recently been involved in one e¤ort in that direction in my work with Hui Chen and Neng Wang Wang, 2010, 2011) . Basically what we do is build a corporate …nance problem around a continuous-time, stochastic, version of the neoclassic q theory of investment a la Hayashi (1982) (which assumes MM neutrality) by adding a reduced-form cost of external …nancing. Granted, this cost could be derived from …rst principles in a model along the lines of DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and Wang (2010), but our point is that this would make the model essentially non-operational.
As is easy to see, an external cost of …nancing creates a role for corporate cash-balances and risk-management along the lines suggested by Froot, Scharstein and Stein (1993) . In-deed, in our dynamic model the critical state variable is the …rm's cash-to-capital ratio (a variable that is easy to construct and track from a …rm's balance sheets). When this ratio is very high the …rm behaves like a …nancially unconstrained …rm, and when it is low the …rm engages in various forms of dynamic hedging, underinvests, possibly sells assets at …re-sale prices, and as a last resort raises costly external …nancing. There is basically no conceptual innovation in this model. However, the model easily lends itself to a quantitative analysis, and by carefully calibrating the key parameters of the model (which can all be easily observed or estimated) one can provide concrete prescriptions to …rms on how much they should invest, how they should manage their cash balances, how much they should engage in dynamic hedging, and how they should …nance their investments. This is only a start and this is a highly simpli…ed model. Still, it is a richer and more realistic model than the dynamic tradeo¤-theory model, and it can provide a quantitative methodology that allows practitioners to take account of agency and limited commitment problems.
Conclusion
By introducing a way of modeling incomplete contracts and by proposing a simple theory of the …rm based on the allocation of residual rights of control, Sandy Grossman's and Oliver Hart's 1986 article has opened the way for formal economic theory to address important issues that had almost exclusively been left to corporate law, management, accounting, and sociology of organization scholars. At the same time, their article has drawn attention to a largely neglected issue in economics, namely limits to contracting that arise from contract enforcement constraints (as opposed to asymmetric information and incentive constraints).
By emphasizing contract enforcement constraints, their article has helped ground the more abstract and general economics of contracts literature in a more institutionally realistic context. Even though it is now 25 years since the publication of their article, this process is still under way and far from complete. There is still too little communication, for my taste, between legal scholars and economists. Still, by taking a bold pragmatic step and introducing somewhat ad hoc (but plausible) constraints on contracting, Sandy Grossman and Oliver Hart have profoundly changed the …eld of contract and institutional economics.
They have made it more relevant and rescued the …eld from "monstrous state-contingent prescriptions".
